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Abstract 
 
Kant holds in his works on morality that prudence is not free, because only action under the moral 
law is free.  He also holds that acting on prudent reasons is incompatible with the moral law.  If one 
explores his lectures on anthropology, however, one has reason to believe that not only is prudent 
action free in some sense as freedom of choice, but it is also not incompatible with moral action, 
since it does not necessitate using other human beings as mere means, even though it is about using 
other human beings as ends to one’s happiness. This article will show how Kant holds these 
positions in his lectures on anthropology. 
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 Not much is said about Kant’s Anthropology and its accompanying lectures as a 
Klugheitslehre, but Kant intended it to be a Klugheitslehre and not merely empirical 
psychology although he does on occasion call it empirical psychology (V-Anth/Parow, AA 
25:243).1  Two questions arise then for the coherence of his anthropology lectures and his 
moral philosophy and one is: how can being prudent be compatible with being moral?   
The second question is whether Kant believes that one is free when one is being prudent.  
Scholars dealing with Kant’s moral philosophy conclude on the basis of his Groundwork to 
the Metaphysics of Morals that moral action is not prudent action and that the two are 
incompatible with each other such that if one is being prudent one is not being moral.  
                                                             
• Philosophy Professor at the University of Louisiana at Monroe in Monroe, LA (USA). E-mail for contact: 
hwilson@lsua.edu  . 
1 Translated by Allen W. Wood in Lectures on Anthropology. 
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Further, they agree that morality is truly free action and that prudent action is relegated to 
sensibility and is, hence, not free.  However, these are not the positions that Kant takes in 
his lectures on anthropology.  In fact, prudent action is compatible with moral action 
though not the same as moral action, and prudence itself is free action, although he calls it 
the free power of choice.  In this essay, I will clarify this position with reference to Kant’s 
lectures on anthropology. 
 
Klugheit as Free? 
 
 Reinhard Brandt, in his article “Klugheit bei Kant,” comes to the conclusion that 
prudent action cannot be explained theoretically as free action.  He writes:  
 
The actions of prudence are positioned just before these alternatives:  they must 
be reckoned to the area of morality or nature.  In the first case, every outer action 
and every judgment stands under the definitive control of the categorical 
imperative, in the second case, it is relegated to the mere appearance of nature, … 
If this interpretation is correct, then Kant’s doctrine of prudence ends in an 
aporia, which perhaps in its theoretical realm no longer allows it to be resolved 
(Brandt, 131). 
 
  In other words, prudent action must be relegated to nature, sensibility, and 
animality, while morality is truly free.  Prudence, then, cannot be free.  But this is a 
confusing situation, since prudence is determined by reason and should be considered free.  
Yet, Kant says in the Groundwork to the Metaphysics of Morals: “hence a free will and a 
will under moral laws are one and the same” (GMS, AA 4:447).2  Kant uses the word 
“Wille” here and we would have to conclude from this passage that only the “Wille” is free.  
Prudence. which is not the “Wille,” is not free.  Prudence, though not having determinate 
means to its end of happiness, does, nevertheless, will the means to its end.  This has to be 
a role of reason and not nature, for the means have to be chosen.  Kant does have a solution 
to this problem, at least in his early lectures on anthropology.  But, first, let me establish 
what the purpose of the lectures is, in order to frame the solution.   
 
Anthropology as a Klugheitslehre 
 
 Holly Wilson has argued that Kant’s Anthropology is a Klugheitslehre (Wilson, 
2016).  With the Friedlander lecture (1775-76), Kant makes it very clear that anthropology 
is not only pragmatic, but that it is also about prudence primarily.  He says:  “Therefore, 
human beings are not studied in speculative terms, but pragmatic, in the application of the 
knowledge according to the rules of prudence, and this is anthropology” (V-Anth/Fried, 
AA 25:470).3  This establishes that the purposes of the anthropology lectures are pragmatic 
                                                             
2 Translated by Mary Gregor in Practical Philosophy. 
3 Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel in Lectures on Anthropology. 
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and also to teach prudence.  Kant goes on to assert: “For all pragmatic doctrines are 
doctrines of prudence, where for all our skills, we also have the means to make proper use 
of everything.  For we study the human being in order to become more prudent…” (V-
Anth/Fried, AA 25:471). 4  Prudence is a skill that seeks out the means that pragmatic 
anthropology teaches, and by prudence, Kant means that the student will know the “proper 
use of everything” (Ibid).   And if this is not clear enough, Kant maintains: “Everything 
that bears no relation to prudent conduct of human beings, does not belong to 
anthropology” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:472).5   In other words, pragmatic anthropology is 
about teaching the skill of prudence.  This statement would exclude empirical psychology 
and any speculative understanding from the anthropology lectures.  The Friedlander lecture 
is not alone in defining the anthropology lectures as determined by prudence. 
Anthropology, for Kant, is, therefore, a Klugheitslehre. 
The Pillau lectures describe the utility of anthropology as “how one should win 
over human beings” (V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25:734). 6   Winning over human beings is 
something that characterizes prudence.  So the purpose again of the anthropology lectures 
is to teach the skill of prudence.  The Menschenkunde lecture characterizes the doctrine as 
knowledge of the world which is knowledge of human beings so we know how to apply 
our knowledge to them, because “we need the assistance of other human beings for the 
attainment of other things…(V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:854). 7  Prudence has to do with 
gaining the cooperation and assistance of other people.  If ‘gaining the assistance of other 
human beings’ is not already clearly defined as prudence, Kant’s lecture goes on to assert: 
“A doctrine is pragmatic insofar as it makes us prudent and useful in public matters…” (V-
Anth/Mensch, AA 25:856).8  All of these passages come from different periods of Kant’s 
lectures, which spanned from 1772-1796, so one could conclude that Kant did, in fact, 
consistently intend his lectures to be a Klugheitslehre.  Prudence is mentioned often in the 
lectures and the content of the lectures, and though Kant is clearly attempting to convey 
knowledge of human beings, it is intended that the students make use of the knowledge for 
the sake of prudence.  The lectures propose to increase the skill in prudence in the students. 
 Kant continues his identification of pragmatic anthropology with prudence in the 
Mrongovius lectures: “Prudence is proficiency or knowledge in reaching one’s aim, and 
making use of this skill or using other human beings for one’s aims…Every pragmatic 
instruction makes one prudent” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1210).9  He goes on to make it very 
clear that pragmatic knowledge is prudence:  “Anthropology is called pragmatic if it serves 
prudence rather than erudition” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1211).10  Finally, even the Busolt 
lecture (1788-1789) identifies the anthropology as a Klugheitslehre.  Kant says: 
                                                             
4 Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel in Lectures on Anthropology. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Translated by Allen W. Wood, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
7 Translated by Robert B. Louden, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in in Lectures on Anthropology. 
10 Ibid. 
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“Anthropology teaches us this, by showing how we can use human beings to our end.  The 
rules of prudence are taught not in the schools but in worldly cognition” (V-Anth/Busolt, 
AA 25:1436). 11   We can conclude that, for Kant, his lectures on anthropology are 
knowledge of the world, which is knowledge of human beings for pragmatic purposes, 
which is equivalent to teaching his students the skill of prudence for the sake of using other 
human beings for one’s own ends. 
 
Happiness as the End of Prudence 
 
 On the face of it, if prudence is using other human beings as a means to one’s own 
ends, it would appear to be in stark contrast to the moral law, as Kant defines it in its 
humanity formulation: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS, 
AA 4:429).12  Prudence is exactly using other human beings as means to one’s own end.  
And that end is happiness.  The question could be raised, however, if by prudence Kant 
means using others as a mere means or whether prudence could be compatible with the 
moral law, because prudence is not using another simply as a means, but also is treating the 
other as an end-in-hemselves at the same time.  
 Repeatedly, beginning with the Collins lecture, Kant associates prudence with the 
end of happiness and he defines happiness in a specific way.  In the Collins lecture he says: 
“Since prudence is a capacity, to reach happiness through the satisfaction of the sum of all 
inclinations…” ( V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:211). 13   The Parow lecture, also defines 
happiness as the sum of all inclinations (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:371).  In the Parow lecture, 
Kant makes it clear that prudence is the means to happiness:  “The capacity to choose the 
best means to happiness is prudence.  Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all 
inclinations…” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:413).  In the Pillau lecture, prudence is defined as 
the skill in the choice of the best means and is about satisfying one’s inclination (V-
Anth/Pillau, AA 25:779).  For the Menschenkunde lecture, happiness is also defined as the 
“complete satisfaction of all of our inclinations” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1081).  The 
reason why it is necessary to know human beings and be able to use them to achieve 
happiness is because “it is always human beings who impede our ability to satisfy our 
inclinations” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1143).  For the Mrongovius, lecture it is affect that 
makes us imprudent and hence incapable of comparing one sensation with the “sum of all 
sensations” (V-Anth/Mron AA 25:1340; 25:1342; 14  V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1115).  
Prudence then is the skill in using other human beings as a means to the end of happiness, 
which is the sum of all inclinations and not just one inclination.  It is important to know 
what the end of prudence is to understand the means to that end.  The means to that end of 
happiness is using other people.  
                                                             
11 Translated by Allen W. Wood, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
12 Translation by Mary Gregor, Practical Philosophy. 
13 Translation is mine unless otherwise noted. 
14 Translation by Robert R. Clewis, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
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 In a passage from the Mrongovoius lecture, Kant maintains: “when a person has 
himself in his power he is happier” and then goes on to say that “unhappiness comes about 
because one cannot abstract according to our power of choice” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 
25:1240).15  Here a person’s happiness depends upon one’s power of choice.  If prudence 
has happiness as its end, then it needs the power of choice to realize its ends.  Later, we 
will speak about the power of choice.  Here, however, the ability to abstract or look away 
from a wart on someone’s nose, or ignore someone’s annoying habits, is important to 
happiness, and is not a self-centered goal or aim, but rather a noble one that allows one to 
look at what is more important in a person, rather than the surface of a person. 
 In any case, we can conclude that just because happiness is the end of prudence, it 
does not mean that it is necessarily self-centered and selfish, and hence against the moral 
law.    
 
Using Other People 
 
 If the end of prudence is happiness, then the means of prudence is using other 
people as one’s own end.  But, does this necessarily mean using people as a mere means?  
Kant defines prudence as ‘using others as one’s own end’ repeatedly throughout the 
lectures (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:855; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1212; V-Anth/Busolt, AA 
25:1436).   However, this means-end way of speaking about prudence is not the only way 
Kant portrays prudence.  Kant also speaks of the usefulness of anthropology that “it 
teaches how one should win over human beings” (V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25:734). 16  
Presumably one could not win over another human being without treating them as an end-
in-themselves or by gaining their cooperation by appealing to their inclinations or reason.  
In this case, one would not be using another human being as a means only, since they are 
cooperating freely, because they have been won over.  In the Menschenkunde, Kant puts it 
a little differently; there he speaks about the fact that “we need the assistance of other 
human beings for the attainment of other things” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25:854).17  The 
human being could, of course, gain the assistance of other human beings by using them as 
a mere means, but it is not ruled out that she gains the assistance of others by appealing to 
their reason or inclinations and wants.  Kant goes on to talk about how “practical 
knowledge of the human being makes us prudent; it is knowledge of the art of how one 
human being has influence on another and can lead him according to his purposes” (V-
Anth/Mensch, AA 25:855). 18  Here it is the purpose of prudence to “influence” other 
people.  So using another person as a means can be interpreted as influencing them and 
gaining their cooperation.   Again, one could influence other people by appealing to their 
affects and passions, but one could also influence others by appealing to their sense of 
                                                             
15 Translation by Robert R. Clewis, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Translated by Robert B. Louden, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
18 Ibid. 
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honor or their reason.  Having an influence on others in order to use them as a means to 
one’s own ends, could very well be a way of appealing to another person’s ends and, 
hence, treating them in a way that they approve of being treated or they consent to being 
treated. 
 Kant speaks also of having an influence on the opinion of the other (V-
Anth/Mensch, AA 25:1146-47).  Presumably if one appeals to the opinion of the other 
person, one is also appealing to the other person’s reason.  One treats another as an end by 
appealing to their reason.  Patrick Kain shows in detail how prudence is related to 
rationality.  The Mrongovius lecture also associates having an influence on another with 
gaining power over others and with achieving one’s ends (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1355-56).  
Again, Kant could be talking about gaining power over someone’s passions and affects or 
he could be talking about gaining power by influencing others to cooperate in one’s ends.  
It is not inconceivable that Kant intends to characterize prudence as the skill that allows 
one to influence other people in a way that gains their freely given cooperation in fulfilling 
one’s ends.  In other words, the other person sees the ends as something worth their 
cooperation and not something that degrades them or treats them as mere means.   
 There is some evidence that Kant believes it is possible to have an influence over 
people who have passions.  “Affect,” Kant says, “opposes not only ethics, but also 
prudence” (V-Anth/Parow AA 25:412).  One could appeal to another’s affects and it would 
be immoral, but Kant also insists that it would be imprudent.  One probably does not 
succeed in achieving one’s ends when one appeals to affect or if one is in the throes of 
affect.  In the Friedlander lecture, Kant clarifies that “therefore it is the rule of wisdom and 
prudence not to tolerate passions in the mind, but courageously to preserve the mind, 
because they make [the mind] unable to carry out deliberations, and to achieve purpose in 
accordance with the prescription of reason” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:621).19  Prudence, then, 
permits deliberations, unless it is overwhelmed by passions.  Still, Kant goes on to say:  
“However, we can thereby promote reason’s efficaciousness and combine the passions 
with reason, but not let them dominate” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:621). 20  So one could 
conceivably have a passion, but still not let it dominate, and have the capacity to deliberate 
and exercise one’s prudence.  This would be the case not only for the person who is 
attempting to achieve his ends, but also for the person who is the means to the other’s ends.  
If one has a passion, another may appeal to that passion for honor, for instance, without 
overriding the other person’s reason, if that passion is not dominating their reason. 
On the other hand, prudence is not so self-centered that it is concerned with using 
other people without their consent, according to the Mrongovius lecture.  There, Kant 
maintains that prudence is using other people, but has in mind what interests everyone as 
well:  “But prudence is a proficiency or knowledge in reaching one’s aim, and making use 
of this skill or using other human beings for one’s aims; but to do this I must avail myself 
of what everyone understands and interests everyone” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1210). 21  
                                                             
19 Translated by G. Felicitas Munzel, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
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This is one indication we have from Kant that prudence is not meant to be simply selfish 
and self-centered, but must take everyone’s concerns into consideration.   
 
Klugheit as Free Action 
 
 As mentioned above, some of Kant’s writings lead one to believe that there is no 
free will except the will that is subordinated to the categorical imperative and, hence, 
prudent action would not be considered free and must be relegated to nature and 
sensibility.  In the last lecture we have, the Busolt lecture on anthropology, Kant seems to 
hold this position as he asserts: “One can consider the human being as a natural and as a 
free being.  As a natural being one considers him according to the predispositions 
encountered in him, and that is the character of the human being as an animal.  With this 
consideration we have made a beginning.  The character of a human being as a free being 
is posited in his will [Wille]” (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1530).  One of the predispositions 
encountered in the human being is the pragmatic predisposition, which has prudence as the 
skill it develops (Anth, AA 7:323; Päd, AA 9:450).  So this would seem to make prudence 
again relegated to nature and human animality.  Yet, this is also inconsistent with Kant’s 
position elsewhere in the Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, where Kant 
argues that the predisposition to animality is different from the predisposition to humanity 
and the moral predisposition, precisely because they use reason (RGV, AA 6:26).  It could 
be that in this passage from the Busolt lecture Kant is not intending to use predisposition in 
the strict philosophical sense he uses it in the Anthropology and in the Religion.   It would 
be then only a tendency.  If that were so, Kant could still consistently hold that the 
pragmatic predisposition is guided by reason and is, hence, “free” in some sense.  What 
that sense is remains to be seen. 
 To be consistent with the Groundwork and with the Busolt passage above, Kant 
cannot mean that prudence is an expression of the Wille or the human will.  Yet, clearly 
prudence, which is guided by reason, must be free in some sense.  The earliest lecture we 
have, the Collins lecture, gives Kant a way to characterize prudence as “free” without 
asserting that it is the same as the “Wille.”  In the Collins lecture and sometimes touched 
upon in the following lecture notes, Kant uses “power of choice” or Willkür to characterize 
prudent action.  He also makes it clear that he considers Willkür to be free action.  Kant 
says in the Collins lecture: “The greatest happiness in the world consists in the power of 
choice, which consists of all remaining acts of exercising and restraining” (V-Anth/Collins, 
AA 25:29).  The power of choice ,or Willkür, is free to do things and to refrain from things.  
I follow Meerbote in translating Willkür as “power of choice” (1982).  The power of choice 
does even more:  “A free power of choice to determine one’s condition oneself, and 
awaken self-activated ideas in oneself.  This belongs to the higher faculty of the soul” (V-
Anth/Collins, 25:29, 30).  The power of choice has the power of self-determination and of 
producing new ideas in oneself.  And this power belongs to the higher faculty of the soul, 
not the lower faculty, which belongs to animality and sensibility.  Every human being has a 
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free power of choice or volition (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:21).  One can also not abandon 
this power of choice (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:30).  Like the Wille, which Kant contrasts to 
inclination, Kant, here in this lecture, contrasts the power of choice with inclination (V-
Anth/Collins, AA 25:30).  
  This 1772 lecture seems to almost equate the power of choice with what Kant will 
later call the Wille, the will.  However, Kant doesn’t just contrast the power of choice with 
inclinations, but also with involuntary actions.  He asserts: “When one is even driven to 
involuntary action, thus our worth is reduced more than if one merely does not have one’s 
sensations in one’s power” (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:69).  Like the Wille, which has 
unconditional worth, the power of choice also gives the human being worth.  But the 
power of choice goes beyond the Wille, since it does more than the Wille.  It also is behind 
the combination of our ideas (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:75).  Attention and abstraction are 
also acts of the power of choice (V-Anth/Collins, AA 25:37-38).  This is significant, 
because these are not acts that Kant will apply to Wille, even though in the later lectures he 
will not speak of the power of choice, but rather of voluntary and involuntary actions.  
The Parow lecture (1772-73) also uplifts the power of choice as a higher power in 
contrast to the lower power of animality.  The higher faculty consists of humanity (V-
Anth/Parow, AA 25:256).  The higher faculty of choice is contrasted with the conditions of 
sensations (ibid).  In fact, by means of the power of choice one directs one’s sensual 
sensations the way one wants (ibid).  Otherwise, sensation impedes the power of choice 
(V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:259).  Significantly, the power of choice is the about self-control 
as well:  “One says the human being is himself not powerful, when his inner condition, or 
himself is not subordinated to the power of choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:292).  The 
power of choice is about being in control of one’s self and one’s inclinations and 
sensations.   On the other hand, involuntary action is a passion (V-Anth/Parow, AA 
25:293).   
Kant makes it clear that the power of choice is a power and is free:  “We have this 
capacity and this is at the same time only a tool.  We have, however, also a power which 
sets this capacity in reality and that is the free power of choice.  We can be moved by the 
lower power, which is physical necessity and animality, or through the free power of 
choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:301).  Here the power of choice is clearly not associated 
with animality or the lower power.  Kant will also say something similar of the Wille in his 
critical works.   
Kant uses the word willkürlich to speak of faculties that are voluntary and he will 
also speak of faculties that are involuntary, like fantasy (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:314).  
Fantasy can stand under the power of choice and is a matter of prudence (V-Anth/Parow, 
AA 25:314-15).  In this passage, Kant associates the power of choice with prudence.  But 
remember, the whole anthropology is about prudence, so any talk of the power of choice 
must also be about prudence.  The power of choice is free, but it also presupposes a 
capability:  “freedom is still only a negative condition under which a human being can 
satisfy his inclination.  The capability must still come to this freedom” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 
25:417).  It is prudence, which aims to fulfill the inclinations.  Kant goes onto say: “The 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS 
International Journal of Philosophy  
N.o 5, Junio 2017, pp. 26-37  
ISSN: 2386-7655 
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.805699 
 
Holly Wilson 
capability is the power through which one can bring into being something which is 
consistent with our power of choice” (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:418).  So something more is 
needed in order for the power of choice to achieve its goals.  What this is, Kant does not 
name, but it is not long after this that Kant speaks of character, which prescribes the laws 
of the will [Wille] (V-Anth/Parow, AA 25:438).  
The Friedlander lecture (1775-1776) continues to speak of the power of choice, and 
it is useful for abstracting from and attending to events or persons:  “If however, I have the 
power of mind under the power of choice and can attend and abstract when I want, then I 
dismiss it from my mind” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:489).22  Obviously more is meant by 
power of choice than the will [Wille], because it pertains to the ability to simply turn our 
attention from one thing to another or to deny perception of things.  Prudence benefits from 
this, since we are much less likely to be caught in the throes of an affect, if we can turn 
away from an object that elicits an affect.  The freedom of which Kant speaks in the 
Friedlander lecture is that which allows one to fulfill one’s inclinations, rather than to 
subordinate one’s inclinations to the moral law so the power of choice is obviously 
something different than the will (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:581).  Yet even though the power 
of choice is concerned with fulfilling inclinations, it is still “free.”  Kant asserts that: 
“Freedom is therefore a general object to satisfy the entirety of inclination” (V-Anth/Fried, 
AA 25:582).23  And what is significant about this freedom is that it allows for us to impute 
responsibility to a person:  “Everything good is also possible through freedom, for nothing 
can very well be imputed to one who is not free” (ibid). 
Passion on the other hand, takes away one’s composure and self-control (V-
Anth/Fried, AA 25:589).  Kant says: “Passion is indeed just that, which is not subject to 
our power of choice and reason” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25:591).24  So passion and affects are 
not subject to our power of choice.  And here Kant associates the power of choice with 
reason.  This is another reason for identifying the power of choice as free.  So, for Kant, 
during this period, the power of choice is not only free, but it is guided by reason.  It is not 
that the power of choice cannot have power over passion, but that one who is in the throes 
of passion is not subject to the power of choice and reason.   Rather, Kant speaks of having 
oneself in one’s power, “so that no impression takes him out of composure…” (V-
Anth/Mensch, AA 25:940).  So the power of choice is not about being subject to the moral 
law, but about self-control and the freedom to fulfill one’s inclinations.  We would also 
have to conclude that the power of choice, if it is oriented toward happiness and is prudent 
action, would have to aim at the sum total of all one’s inclinations.  Both the power of 
choice and prudence aim at satisfying inclinations.  Hence, the power of choice is the kind 
of will that prudence makes use of.  Prudence is not a factor of the Wille, but it is a factor 
of the power of choice (Willkür).  Both the will and the power of choice are, hence, free.   
                                                             
22 Translation by G. Felicitas Munzel, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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The power of choice and prudence are impeded by affects and passions.  So their 
relationship is very tight.  One can easily conclude that prudence is effective through the 
power of choice rather than through the will.  This preserves Kant’s connection between 
character, the moral law, and will, while at the same time giving an account of how 
prudent action is also free action, even if not moral action.  Kant continues to speak of the 
power of choice in the Menschenkunde (1781-82) lectures.  There he asserts: “The human 
being is at rest, when he has the state of his mind in his power of choice” (V-Anth/Mensch, 
AA 25:1114-15).  Not to have one’s mind in one’s power of choice is to be disturbed.  
Kant also speaks of the freedom to satisfy one’s inclinations (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 
25:1142).  Freedom is an inclination.  One needs freedom in order to fulfill one’s 
inclination to freedom.  This has to be the power of choice, which is aimed at inclinations.  
As Kant maintains in the Busolt lecture: “By means of freedom the human being is in the 
condition so that he can satisfy unimpeded inclinations of all sorts” (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 
25:1520). 
Kant does not talk about the power of choice much after his early lectures, but he 
does occasionally mention it and he speaks often of freedom to pursue inclinations and by 
this freedom he certainly doesn’t mean moral freedom or freedom of the will, since it is 
precisely against inclinations that the moral law is effective.  But Kant does have a way of 
talking about prudence and the kind of freedom appropriate to it with the concept of the 
power of choice.  So there really is no aporia regarding prudence and its freedom.  Kant 
himself calls the power of choice free.  One might protest that the talk of the free power of 
choice preceded Kant’s critical turn, but we have plenty of references to freedom to pursue 
inclinations even after the critical turn (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25:1520; V-Anth/Mron, AA 
25:1358; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1419; V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1213).  In fact, Kant claims 
that: “The greatest perfection of man is that of being able to act according to his power of 
choice, to direct his cognition to an object and again turn away from it” (V-Anth/Mron, 
AA 25:1231). 25   Even here in the Mrongovius lecture (1784-85), power of choice 
presupposes freedom, the freedom to choose between two different things – whether to pay 
attention to something or ignore it.  This Kant calls the greatest perfection of man.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Kant defines prudence as using others for one’s own ends and he articulates its end as 
happiness. Pursing happiness also requires taking the inclinations of other human beings 
into consideration and hence does not necessarily mean that a person is used as a mere 
means.   In order to pursue the end of happiness, one has to take the appropriate means to 
                                                             
25 Translated by Robert R. Clewis, in Lectures on Anthropology. 
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Holly Wilson 
that end, and for that one needs freedom.  This is not the freedom of the free will, however, 
it is freedom as power of choice.  The power of choice allows one to choose between 
things and makes it possible to choose to use others as means also, while treating them as 
an end.  The power of choice is, hence, free, and needs to be free in order to achieve its 
end.  So this solves the aporia that Brandt so artfully articulates. 
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